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Спроба привернути увагу до небезпеки нового виду тероризму: електромагнітного. Приведені відомості з відкритих 
джерел про історію створення нового виду зброї, про країни, компанії і фахівців, що займають лідируюче положення в 
цій області. Показано, що сучасні електроенергетичні об'єкти дуже вразливі щодо навмисних електромагнітних 
впливів, враховуючи широке застосування мікропроцесорної техніки і комп'ютерів в умовах, коли вже сьогодні на рин-
ку є технічні засоби, що дозволяють здійснювати атаки на такі об'єкти. 
 
Попытка привлечь внимание к опасности нового вида терроризма: электромагнитного. Приведены сведения из от-
крытых источников об истории создания нового вида оружия, о странах, компаниях и специалистах, занимающих 
лидирующее положение в этой области. Показано, что современные электроэнергетические объекты весьма уязвимы 
в отношении преднамеренных электромагнитных воздействий из-за широкого применения микропроцессорной тех-
ники и компьютеров в условиях, когда уже сегодня на рынке имеются технические средства, позволяющие осуществ-
лять атаки на такие объекты. 
 
The theory behind the E-bomb was proposed in 1925 
by physicist Arthur H. Compton not to build weapons, but 
to study atoms. Compton demonstrated that firing a 
stream of highly energetic photons into atoms that have a 
low atomic number causes them to eject a stream of elec-
trons. Physics students know this phenomenon as the 
Compton Effect. It became a key tool in unlocking the 
secrets of the atom. Ironically, this nuclear research led to 
an unexpected demonstration of the power of the Comp-
ton Effect, and spawned a new type of weapon. In 1958, 
nuclear weapons designers ignited hydrogen bombs high 
over the Pacific Ocean. The detonations created bursts of 
gamma rays that, upon striking the oxygen and nitrogen in 
the atmosphere, released a tsunami of electrons that 
spread for hundreds of miles. Street lights were blown out 
in Hawaii and radio navigation was disrupted for 18 hours 
as far away as Australia. The United States set out to learn 
how to "harden" electronics against this electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) and develop EMP weapons. 
 Now, intensive investigations in electromagnetic 
weapons field are being carried out in Russia, the USA, Eng-
land, Germany, and China. In the USA such research is car-
ried out by the biggest companies of the military-industrial 
establishment, such as TWR, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, 
Los Alamos National Laboratories, the Air Force Research 
Laboratory at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and 
many civil organizations and universities.  
In the 1990’s the U.S. Air Force Office of Scientific 
Research set up a five-year Multidisciplinary University 
Research Initiative (MURI) program to explore micro-
wave sources. One of those funded was the University of 
New Mexico's Schamiloglu, whose lab is located just a 
few kilometers down the road from where the Shiva Star 
sits behind tightly locked doors.  
The German company "Rheinmetall Weapons and 
Munitions" has also been researching E-weapons for 
years and has test versions. 
The EMP shell was designed following revelations 
that Russia was well ahead of the West in the develop-
ment of so-called radio-frequency weapons. A paper 
given at a conference in Bordeaux in 1994 made it clear 
that the Russians believed it possible to use such weapons 
to disable all of an enemy's electronic equipment. Written 
by Dr. A B. Prishchipenko, Deputy Director of Scientific 
Center "Sirius", Member-correspondent of the Russian 
Academy of Military Sciences and entitled "Radio Fre-
quency Weapons on the Future Battlefield", it described 
Soviet research dating back to the late forties, provoking 
near panic among western military planners (A.B. 
Prishchepenko, V.V. Kiseljov, and I.S. Kudimov, "Radio 
Frequency Weapon at the Future Battlefield", Electro-
magnetic environment and consequences, Proceedings of 
the EUROEM94, Bordeaux, France, May 30-June 3, 
1994, part 1, p. 266-271). It gave credence to the night-
mare scenario of a high-technology war in which all the 
radio, radar and computer systems on which their weap-
ons depended would be disabled, leaving them completely 
defenseless. Then two years ago it emerged that the Rus-
sians had developed an electro-magnetic device, a so-
called E-Bomb, capable of disabling electrical and elec-
tronic systems, which could be carried in a briefcase. 
Amid intelligence reports showing that the Irish IRA had 
discussed the possibility of paralyzing the City of London 
with an E-Bomb, British research in that technology was 
stepped up. 
Today in Russia electromagnetic weapons are being 
developed by huge research and production institutions 
like the Scientific Association for High-Temperatures 
(OIVT), consisting of the following Moscow organiza-
tions: the Institute of High Temperatures of Academy of 
Sciences; the Institute of Thermal Physics of Extremal 
States; the Institute of Theoretical and Applied Electrody-
namics; the Research-and-Development Center of Ther-
mal Physics of Impulse Excitations, and the proving 
ground in Bishkek; in addition the All-Russian Scientific 
Research Institute of Experimental Physics in Sarov (Ar-
zamas-16) in the Nizhni Novgorod region; the All-
Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics 
in Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70). In spite of the economic 
crisis in Russia and a lack of money for many military 
programs, the government allocates money to these insti-
tutions. For example, recently in Moscow for the Scien-
tific Association OIVT, a new building with an area of 1.5 
thousand square meters has been built. 
As of late, many projects of past age have been de-
classified and are freely sold today. For example, the In-
stitute of High Current Electronics of the Russian Acad-
emy of Sciences in Tomsk (HCEI SB RAS) offers at free 
sale ultra-wideband high-power sources of directional 
electromagnetic radiation (Fig.1). 
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Fig. 1. Compact ultra-wideband generators of directional pulse 
electromagnetic radiation with power output of 100 – 1000 
Megawatts (Institute of High Current Electronics, Russia) 
As the technology of military RF weapons matures, 
such weaponry also becomes affordable and usable by 
criminals and terrorists. Both cheap low-tech and expen-
sive high-tech weapons exist. High-power sources and 
other components to build EM weapons are available on 
the open market and proliferate around the globe, Fig. 2. 
One potential ingredient made available by the mili-
tary is old radars, sold when facilities close down. Any-
thing that operates between 200 MHz and 4 or 5 GHz 
seems to be a real problem. The reason they are for sale is 
that they are not very effective. Radar technology has 
improved drastically, but the radar doesn't need to be the 
newest technology to cause problems to electronic 
equipment and systems that aren't prepared for an inten-
tional EM threat. Intentional EMI includes both pulses 
and continuous-wave signals, in two basic forms. One is 
high-power microwave (HPM), a continuous-wave signal 
at a given frequency that continues for a microsecond or 
two at a Gigahertz, like radar. The other is ultra-
wideband, which is essentially a fast pulse produced by a 
radar using pulse techniques rather than a continuous 
wave. These threats can be packaged in a mobile van or 
even a suitcase. The effective ranges decrease with size, 
but even a suitcase-sized threat is widely available. Ac-
cording to Peter Cotterill, managing director of MPE Ltd. 
(Liverpool, UK), an electromagnetic bomb in a suitcase 
with a range possibly as high as 500 m can be purchased 
on the Internet at the cost of only $100,000. Terrorists 
could use a less expensive, low-tech approach to create 
the same destructive power. "Any nation with even a 
1940’s technology base could make them," says Carlo 
Kopp, an Australian-based expert on high-tech warfare. 
"The threat of E-bomb proliferation is very real." POPU-
LAR MECHANICS estimates a basic weapon could be 
built for $400.  
Nowadays there are no measures preventing distri-
bution of electronic weapons. Even if agreements on limi-
tation of distribution of electromagnetic weapons are 
reached, they won’t be able to solve the problem of acces-
sibility of required materials and equipment. 
One cannot rule out the possibility of leakage of 
electromagnetic weapons technology from countries of 
the former USSR to third world countries, or to terrorist 
organizations, as the former really face great economic 
difficulties. The danger of distribution of electromagnetic 
weapons is quite real. 
Today it is possible to find finished drawings and de-
scriptions of generators of directional high frequency radia-
tion based on household microwave ovens on the Internet 
(see: www.powerlabs.org, www.voltsamps.com, etc). 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Fig. 2 Electromagnetic Bombs 
a - Russian GPS-guided KAB-500S type Electromagnetic Bomb 
(right); b - typical construction of an E-bomb 
Problems of "electromagnetic terrorism" capable of 
causing man-caused accidents on a national scale similar 
to that which happened in New-York in August 2003, 
were formulated in an article by Manuel W. Wik (now 
chief engineer and strategic specialist on future defense 
science and technology programs at the Defence Materiel 
Administration, Stockholm) "Electromagnetic Terrorism 
– What are the Risks? What can be Done? ", Published in 
1997 in the "International Product Compliance Maga-
zine". Here is what that article says on the subject: 
"Although electromagnetic terrorism is not often dis-
cussed in public, as it is potentially an extremely sensitive 
issue, there needs to be wider public awareness of the 
threats posed and a better understanding of the consequent 
risk-management strategies required. Nevertheless, with the 
gradual development of smaller equipment that can be used 
to produce short, intense electromagnetic pulses capable of 
damaging the controls of much electronic equipment, elec-
tromagnetic terrorism is increasingly something that needs 
to be considered during the compliance-planning route. 
Thus, although it is important that neither the details of 
electromagnetic (EM) interaction with particular systems 
nor specific vulnerabilities should be made public, public 
awareness of the potential threats and, indeed, a better un-
derstanding of the relevant risk-management strategies 
need to be more widely disseminated. Electromagnetic 
terrorism (EM terrorism) is the intentional, malicious gen-
eration of electromagnetic energy, introducing noise or 
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signals into electric and electronic systems, thus disrupting, 
confusing or damaging these systems for terrorist or crimi-
nal purposes. EM terrorism can be regarded as one type of 
offensive information warfare. EM terrorism needs to be 
considered more carefully in the future because information 
and information technology are increasingly important in 
everyday life".  
Electronic components and circuits, such as micro-
processors, are working at increasingly higher frequencies 
and lower voltages and thus are increasingly more suscep-
tible to electromagnetic interference (EMI).  
At the same time, there have been rapid advances in 
radio frequency (RF) sources and antennae and there is an 
increasing variety of equipment capable of generating 
very short RF pulses that can disrupt sophisticated elec-
tronics. Intentional electromagnetic interference (EMI) 
poses a significant threat worldwide. Until recently, in-
dustry has been resistant to addressing the issue, but the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) is be-
ginning to develop methods to fight criminal EMI.  
The possibility of intentional EMI has come under 
the scrutiny of the United States Congress. Representative 
Jim Saxton of New Jersey and Representative Roscoe 
Bartlett of Maryland have held several investigations con-
cerning this threat and have lobbied Congress for funds 
for appropriate research. As early as February 1998, 
Saxton began holding hearings on the proliferation and 
threat of RF weapons.  
The issue of intentional EMI has also begun to be 
addressed at international conferences. The 1999 Interna-
tional Zurich Symposium on EMC held the first work-
shop on intentional EMI, with nearly 200 people in atten-
dance. The 2001 Zurich Symposium was the culmination 
of several years of work in the field of intentional EMI. 
This symposium included the first refereed session on 
intentional EMI. The threat of intentional EMI is not lim-
ited to RF energy. Most of the emphasis in this area has 
been on radio-frequency fields but the issue of injecting 
directly into power and telecom systems has been over-
looked. Yuri Parfenov and Vladimir Fortov, of the Rus-
sian Academy of Sciences Institute for High Energy Den-
sities, recently experimented with injection of distur-
bances into power lines outside a building and found that 
the signals penetrate very easily and at a high enough 
voltage to cause damage to computers inside the building. 
Additionally, radiated fields often become a conducted 
threat due to coupling of RF energy to exposed wires.  
 It is astonishing that numerous research projects 
devoted to EM terrorism are concerned with the EMI im-
pact on such objects as communication systems, tele-
communications, air-planes, computers, but there are 
practically no projects devoted to investigation of resis-
tance of microprocessor-based relays to EMI, malfunc-
tioning of which cam lead to high consequences. How-
ever, it is obvious without any investigations that micro-
processor based relays are more prone to EMI impact than 
electromechanical and even analog electronic ones.  
 In addition, it turns out that "electromagnetic terror-
ism" is not the only form of modern remote terrorism to 
which microprocessor-based relays are prone. There are 
also electronic intrusions called cyber-attacks.  
 A cyber intrusion is a form of electronic intrusion 
where the attacker uses a computer to invade electronic 
assets to which he or she does not have authorized access. 
The IEEE defines electronic intrusions as: 
Entry into the substation via telephone lines or 
other electronic-based media for the manipulation 
or disturbance of electronic devices. These devices 
include digital relays, fault recorders, equipment 
diagnostic packages, automation equipment, com-
puters, PLC’s, and communication interfaces.  
A cyber-attack can be an intrusion as described 
above, or a denial of service attack (DOS) where the at-
tacker floods the victim with nuisance requests and/or 
messages to the extent that normal services and functions 
cannot be maintained. A DOS attack is also called a flood 
attack. A distributed DOS attack (D-DOS) is a flood at-
tack launched simultaneously from multiple sites. 
Tools for attacking computer-based control equip-
ment by telephone and network connection are free and 
widely available over the Internet. There are literally doz-
ens of Web sites devoted to hacking, usually providing 
downloadable programs or scripts to help the novice 
hacker get started. 
 Nowadays hackers’ attacks are becoming terrorist 
weapons. Real cases of terrorist attacks of this kind are 
usually kept secret, but some are already known. For ex-
ample, an attempt to damage the Israeli power system 
with the help of a hacker’s attack was prepared by the 
"Special Services" of Iran for several months in 2003. 
Fortunately, the security service of the Israel Electric 
Corp. managed to block these attacks. As attacks of this 
kind to the main national computer systems of Israel have 
become more frequent, within Israeli Counter-Intelligence 
and Internal Security Service (SHABAK) there is a spe-
cial subdivision for counteraction to such attacks. 
  But this problem is not only actual for Israel. The 
North American electric power network is vulnerable to 
electronic intrusions (a.k.a. cyber-attacks) launched from 
anywhere in the world, according to studies by the White 
House, FBI, IEEE, North American Electric Reliability 
Council (NERC), and National Security Telecommunica-
tions Advisory Committee (NSTAC). At the heart of this 
vulnerability is the capability for remote access to control 
and protection equipment used by generation facilities 
and Transmission and Distribution (T&D) utilities. Re-
mote access to protective equipment historically has been 
limited to proprietary systems and dedicated network 
connections. Now, however, there is an increased use of 
public telephone services, protocols, and network facili-
ties, concurrent with a growing, more sophisticated, 
worldwide population of computer users and computer 
hackers which is why special services of many countries 
had to create special subdivisions to fight this dangerous 
phenomenon. In Russia in particular, it is the Federal 
Agency of Governmental Communication and Informa-
tion (FAQCI) that tackles these problems. 
Is there a solution for this situation?  
Probably yes, if: 
- We completely replace all electric wires connected to 
microprocessor relays, including current and voltage cir-
cuits, with non-conductive fiber-optical wires; 
- Use opto-electronic CT and VT, instead of traditional 
instrument transformers;  
- Provide full galvanic separation from the power electric 
network by using a power supply of microprocessor re-
lays to carry through the unit “motor generator”,  
- The microprocessor based relays should be placed in a 
completely closed metal case made with a special tech-
nology, used for ultrahigh frequencies in which there are 
no other kinds of the electric equipment,  
This is the price necessary to pay for progress in the field 
of relay protection! 
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